Recent evidence suggests that our capacities to remember the past and to imagine what might happen in the future largely depend on the same core brain network that includes the middle temporal lobe, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex. However, the extent to which regions of this core brain network are also responsible for our capacity to think about what could have happened in our past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic counterfactual thinking), is still unknown. The present study examined this issue. Using a variation of the experimental recombination paradigm (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009. Neuropsychologia. 47: 2222-2238), participants were asked both to remember personal past events and to envision alternative outcomes to such events while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. Three sets of analyses were performed on the imaging data in order to investigate two related issues. First, a mean-centered spatiotemporal partial least square (PLS) analysis identified a pattern of brain activity across regions of the core network that was common to episodic memory and episodic counterfactual thinking. Second, a non-rotated PLS analysis identified two different patterns of brain activity for likely and unlikely episodic counterfactual thoughts, with the former showing significant overlap with the set of regions engaged during episodic recollection. Finally, a parametric modulation was conducted to explore the differential engagement of brain regions during counterfactual thinking, revealing that areas such as the parahippocampal gyrus and the right hippocampus were modulated by the subjective likelihood of counterfactual simulations. These results suggest that episodic counterfactual thinking engages regions that form the core brain network, and also that the subjective likelihood of our counterfactual thoughts modulates the engagement of different areas within this set of regions.
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Introduction
Traditionally, the notion of episodic memory has been used in reference to the psychological capacity to remember the past (Tulving, 1985) . As a result, most research on episodic memory has focused on episodic recollection: the cognitive process of bringing past experiences back to mind (Tulving, 2002) . However, recent evidence suggests striking commonalities between the cognitive and neural processes required to remember one's past and those required to imagine one's future (for recent reviews, see Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012; Szpunar, 2010) . Evidence from three lines of research supports this claim. First, neuropsychological studies with populations known to have episodic memory deficits, such as patients with amnesia (Tulving, 1985; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; but see Squire et al., 2010) , severe depression (Dickson & Bates, 2005; Williams et al., 1996) , schizophrenia (D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008 ), Alzheimer's disease (Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 2009 ) and mild cognitive impairment (Gamboz et al., 2010) show that they also exhibit impairments when mentally simulating events that may happen in their future, a cognitive process that has come to be known as episodic future thinking (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 2010 
